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Abstract 
Concerns about patient safety have prompted studies of adverse surgical events (ASEs) but 
descriptive classification of errors and malpractice claims have overshadowed qualitative 
investigations into the processes that lead to expert errors and their solutions. We studied 
consultant surgeon’s perspectives on how and why events occurred through semi-structured 
interviews about general and specific events. The sample contained heterogeneous cross-
section of ages, gender and specialism, with > 2 years consultant status and working within a 
25 mile radius. Overarching findings included (i) pressures to work harder, faster and beyond 
capability within a blaming culture; (ii) optimism bias from over-confidence and 
complacency; (iii) multiple pressures to ‘finish’ an operation or list, resulting in completion 
bias. Seven high order themes were identified on the healthcare system, adverse event types, 
contributing factors, emotions, cognitive processes, error detection, and strategies, solutions 
and barriers. The process of classifying event types guided solution selection, and the decision 
about whether to formally report it. How serious consequences were for patients and their 
temporal effects, defined an adversity continuum. Minor events arose routinely i.e. technical 
discrepancies, side-effects. More problematic were sub-optimal outcomes and avoidable 
events. Despite their expertise, consultants were vulnerable to unavoidable, uncontrollable 
events which were major concerns. Most serious were near-misses, errors and mistakes. 
However major errors did not inevitably lead to a catastrophe and minor errors could be 
extremely serious. A ‘cascade’ of minor events exacerbated by negative emotions can 
precipitate major events, and interception methods need investigation. Consultants felt 
powerless and helpless to change environmental, organizational and systemic problems; new 
communication and action channels are desirable. Confidence building in team leadership 
would promote ‘flatter’ hierarchies, facilitating appropriate warnings. Although implementing 
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the WHO Checklist averts important problems, social, environmental and organizational 
contributing factors are largely overlooked here and in existing models. 
Keywords:  surgeon, consultant, adverse event, qualitative, error, process  
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From 17 million surgical procedures completed annually in NHS hospitals (Hospital Episode 
Statistics, 2007), adverse surgical events (ASEs) constitute 5% (850,000 pa). Similar figures 
exist for malpractice claims (Greenberg et al, 2007; Griffen et al, 2007; Morris et al, 2003; 
Rogers et al, 2006). Consequences from ASEs vary in seriousness from slight/temporary to 
death (Brennan et al, 1991). Fifty-two % of surgical errors (rather than errors in patient care) 
are technical, being manual (65%), judgement (9%), or both (26%) (Regenbogen et al 2007). 
More importantly, two-thirds of technical errors are made by experienced surgeons, and 84% 
of these during routine procedures (Regenbogen et al 2007). This contrasts with research 
linking insufficient experience, low volume and highly complex operations to errors (Sosa et 
al, 1998; Porter et al, 1998; Prystowsky, 2005; Wilkiemeyer et al, 2005). Unexpected patient 
factors like difficult anatomy; human factors such as decision-making, and system-
complicating problems e.g. equipment, also contribute (Regenbogen et al, 2007). Decision-
making studies show that 86% of incidents arise from cognitive factors e.g. vigilance 
(Gawande et al, 2003), affecting 65% of malpractice claims (Rogers et al, 2006).  
However, cognitive factors only partly explain how events occur; they combine with factors 
like communication breakdown (Williams, Silverman, Schwind et al, 2007), inadequate 
supervision and technology failures. Despite longstanding research on cognitive processes 
(Reason, 1990), they have only recently been applied to surgery (Vincent, et al 2001; Sarker 
and Vincent, 2005). Other psychological processes are infrequently investigated. Building on 
previous research, we aim to further investigate these processes because in practice, they 
could be intercepted. 
Recently the NHS implemented routine use of a World Health Organisation (WHO) Checklist 
during operations (Gawande et al, 2003; World Alliance for Patient Safety, 2008). This warns 
about wrong patient or body site operations, incorrect anaesthesia/resuscitation, infection risk 
and ineffective teamwork. Physical and functional actions in the Checklist are partially 
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commensurate with cognitive models, but emotional, social, organisational and structural 
mechanisms remain largely overlooked. Furthermore, qualitative approaches are rarely used 
to gain detailed access to surgeon’s perspectives, as quantitative research is preferred. 
Statistics offer rare and partial insights into how and why contributory factors affect ASEs, 
showing only that they do. Little is known about the recent experience of experts in surgical 
practice, as trainees are typically studied. We hypothesised that qualitative techniques would 
better elicit information about complex behaviours and interactions than quantitative methods. 
The study aim was therefore to find out how expert consultant surgeons view ASEs.   
 
Method 
Sampling: Sixty-one consultant surgeons from two NHS hospitals (south-west England) were 
identified within a 25 mile radius from the Dr Foster website (compendium of medical 
experts). This pool was large as limited response was anticipated. We planned to recruit a 
heterogeneous cross-section of specialists, age and gender groups. The exclusion criterion 
was consultant status <2 years. Although not representative, this self-selected group have 
more interest/insight into ASEs; small numbers are acceptable for in-depth techniques. 
Surgeons were recruited until no new themes emerged i.e. saturation (Smith, Jarman and 
Osborne, 1999; Silverman, 2006). 
Procedure: Following ethical approval (local NHS Research & Development) a written 
invitation to a face-to-face interview about surgical errors, slips, and ‘near misses’ was 
followed by a phone call to arrange it. Participants were assured of anonymity and 
confidentiality, and could withdraw at any time. These conditions were vital to accessing 
information on this very sensitive topic. Semi-structured questions explored general, then 
specific event(s) covering errors, decisions, warnings and contributory factors. An open-
ended technique then flexibly explored remaining issues (Smith, et al, 1999). Audio-tapes 
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were transcribed. To protect identity, personal details, specialism, procedures, body parts and 
medical conditions were coded.   
Analysis: Following Smith, et al (1999), themes in the first transcript structured coding and 
connections. These were extended and changed by subsequent transcripts. Quotations 
supported theme clusters, super-ordinate concepts and sub-themes (Elliott, Fischer & Rennie, 
1999). New issues were highlighted. Themes shared by participants represent the higher order 
themes reported. Reliability was established by an independent recoding of transcripts; 
discrepancies were negotiated.  
Results 
Sample: Eleven consultant surgeons (10 men; 1 woman) were interviewed (2007). None 
withdrew. As the 11th interview added no new themes, sampling was concluded. The mean 
interview time was 37 minutes (range 17-64). 
Interviews were obtained from a rich cross-section of participants aged 42-56 years; 10 were 
British, one overseas. They had been consultants for 7-20 years, practiced surgery for >13 
years, and specialised in orthopaedics, obstetrics, otolaryngology, urology, vascular or general 
surgery.  
Themes: Seven important new higher order themes frame the analysis: (i) healthcare system, 
(ii) factors contributing to error, (iii) ASE types, (iv) cognitive processes, (v) detecting errors, 
(vi) emotions, (vii) strategies, solutions and barriers to action (Table 1). As expected, themes 
on errors, decision-making, warnings and contributory factors largely confirmed or informed 
known cognitive processes.  
                                                INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
(i) Healthcare System  
The context of operations was very important in influencing working practices, how ASEs 
occurred, and whether they were reported (Table 2). 
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National Political Context: Policy influenced practice, and undue focus on targets affected it 
adversely, by increasing pressure e.g. adding patients to lists, increasing risks. Such processes 
were barely apparent from ‘outside’.  
The Government has forced us to squeeze through vast numbers of operations in a system that 
may have been working below capacity but was then forced to work above capacity. It’s not 
the right way to do it! I don’t think too many people have died or suffered as a result but it 
was a hazardous thing to do (A19). 
Increased use of performance tables/rankings biased patient selection. Surgeons adapted to 
this pressure in self-protective ways by selecting ‘low risk’ patients to ensure acceptable 
mortality rates. 
If you do an average operation on a patient who is going to do well, they’ll probably do well. 
Whereas if you do a technically fantastic operation on a patient whose going to do badly, 
they’ll do badly, and so measuring your outcome has as much to do with who you pick to do it 
on, which is why crude measures of death rates …are not very good (A20.) 
Limited experience of junior surgeons due to legal reductions in working hours affected rates. 
 (Trainee surgeon have had) huge reductions in hours and…are now trying to train in about a 
third of the time that we trained in. And is that okay… to let them out onto the general public 
at that stage? Well, probably most of the time, yes…but occasionally, maybe critically, no 
(A20). 
Local Political and Managerial Context. How consultants worked was heavily influenced by 
the hospital organisation (Table 2), and management were seen as responsible for providing 
adequate working conditions. 
You need to know that the hospital does look (at whether) the theatre is working, and the kit 
works and is reliable, and there’s an adequate supply of beds (A17) 
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Poor management reduced performance and increased error rates through pressures of 
insufficient time to do the job properly and to ‘cut corners’. 
You don’t want to have people...counting how long you are taking…and feeling that the 
organisation is pressurising you to do things…technically…that you don’t want to do, or in 
terms of time (A17). 
We sometimes start an operation or...list, knowing that (certain) conditions should be 
fulfilled... to produce the ideal environment. We know sometimes that we are ‘skating on thin 
ice’.  Either we’ve done a list that is ridiculously silly, or we’ve got a team that is not up to 
the task (A19).  
The seeming inability of NHS administrators to schedule established teams to work together 
was a major criticism. This made ASEs more likely and inhibited their detection. New teams 
were less co-ordinated and unacquainted with each other’s strengths and weaknesses. This 
could be crucial in a crisis.  
Sometimes surgeons were pressurised to conduct operations they were not competent to 
perform, so where ASEs occurred, the system was often implicated.  
What we are dealing with...is whether the right surgeon is dealing with the right 
procedure...That’s an endemic festering sore in the NHS but it is the nature of a system where 
junior staff are being taught how to do things. Occasionally they will be doing things in the 
middle of the night which would have been better (done by) a more experienced person. But 
that’s not the way the system works…it’s not staffed to deal with it (A19). 
It was believed that national and local “Politics” had sought and achieved disempowerment of 
consultant surgeons, allowing standards to slip and increasing risks.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
(ii) Factors contributing to Adverse Surgical Events 
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Table 2 identifies factors contributing to ASEs. Environmental factors including the 
organisation and culture of health care were major concerns that were largely controllable by 
management. Arrangements necessary for optimal outcomes could be absent and hard to 
remedy e.g. no intensive care beds.  
But these details were not new. Of note was that few ideas were expressed about how to 
correct organisational, social and environmental factors. Surgeons felt powerless to make 
changes outside their immediate remit of practice i.e. physical treatment of individuals. 
Consultants acknowledged their personal role in ASEs, and accounts often revealed intense 
self-criticism and self-blame. Task and ergonomic factors played key roles but these were 
potentially controllable and correctable through retraining. Being unable to anticipate a 
minefield of largely uncontrollable patient factors was perplexing e.g. obesity, inflammation, 
temperature; and these were common impediments. Team communications could be 
dysfunctional occurring too often, insufficiently or inappropriately. Processes involving some 
of these factors are exemplified below. 
(iii) Types of Adverse Surgical Events. 
Adverse surgical events were conceptualised in seven distinct types (see Table 3) ranging 
along a continuum of seriousness, tempered by frequency of occurrence.  
Technical discrepancies were small, simple things that went wrong but were correctable 
during surgery. They occurred too often and routinely to be classified as near misses. 
It is a technical thing...um...a knot might come undone or slip. That probably happens in most 
procedures (A17). 
Side-effects. Some events were side-effects of the procedure, being an inherent part of the 
operation, not an error. 
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We remove an organ and adjacent to that will be some nerve structures. We know that the… 
technique by which the operation is done will lead to nerve damage in 20% of cases say, so 
risk is inherent in the operation. So…there is no way of avoiding that risk (A24). 
Complications This term was used in a generic and euphemistic sense to describe all types of 
error. Specifically it described events arising from sheer biological variability, even when no 
mistakes had apparently been made. This was common in technically difficult operations e.g. 
neurology, and with unexpected/unknown patient factors e.g. tight skin. 
If you are operating...very near the brain all the time you would expect to have more 
complications (A17). 
Sub-optimal outcomes. Many surgeons saw sub-optimal outcomes as ASEs.  
I would say that the outcome could be described as um...potentially better, in between 5 to 
10% of cases (A19). 
However, standards of acceptability were determined by individual consultants, and were 
therefore variable. 
…But is his decision-making good? Well, he’s decided he’s not going to spend another 10 
minutes doing it perfectly. I just wished I could put the breaks on this bloke and get him to 
slow down and do it just a little more carefully because people would do so much better if 
he’d do it like that (A20). 
Avoidable and unavoidable events were highly elaborated. Known complications could be 
anticipated, avoided or controlled but unavoidable events were caused by unexpected, 
uncontrollable factors; some were only detected post-operatively.  
Well there are errors that you foresee are going to happen because the case may be 
complicated, so you can often avoid those. There are other cases where you’ve got no control 
over who is on your list (and) whose assisting you, and....you find (something) in the 
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operation that you weren’t expecting. Then there are those cases that you think have gone 
completely well, and it’s only when the patient wakes up  you find…a problem. (A22)  
                                                      INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Near-misses and errors or mistakes (below) often involved known cognitive processes. These 
were usually reported as an evaluation/interpretation mistake (Reason, 1990) e.g. bleeding 
from a failed stitch, a wrong side operation, or an action/execution mistake or slip e.g. 
missing swab, retractor failure. Perception slips/mistakes were rare (Table 3). 
Sometimes a supervised near-miss was used in a controlled way to teach trainees. This did not 
normally result in an ASE.  
Errors and mistakes mainly resulted from mistaken judgement and flawed practice. They 
were identified by the size and seriousness of consequences for patients. Outcomes ranged 
from very minor e.g. temporary leakage, to major e.g. death, permanent disability, 
supplementary operation or hospitalisation. Paradoxically, small errors might cause 
catastrophic problems; conversely few (or no) ill effects could result from major errors. 
Defining an error was important as it strongly influenced whether it was officially reported 
and the likelihood of professional consequences.  
Error and near-miss reporting...depends on…individual surgeons or...teams, and what their 
criteria are; what level they set as to what constitutes a near-miss (A30). 
Where multiple errors contributed to events an action/execution mistake/slip was often 
compounded by an evaluation/interpretation mistake/slip in a ‘cascade’ of errors. 
There is a sort of cascade...when there has been an accumulation of small events…although 
often each individual part is relatively small. Somebody is called away unexpectedly, or 
people are off sick, and then you know you’re (definitely) more stretched and the difficulty is 
in knowing when to say ‘Actually it’s not safe to go on’. (It’s fine to) go on if things proceed 
smoothly but then...you get on that slippery slope leading to errors (A23). 
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This was not an all encompassing classification but rather a series of overlapping ideas each 
with its own contribution to understanding and classifying error. In particular, different terms 
reflected both different errors in different specialities, and different responses to the same 
error. 
(iv) Cognitive Processes 
These themes differed in richness of responding. Accounts of shifts in decision-making were 
unforthcoming as participants had difficulty recalling thinking stages. Like other work, 
surgeons saw that automatic thinking reduced work strain. It guarded against problems 
occurring, through subconscious error checks and subtle adjustments. However it was 
negatively implicated in ASEs. They recognised that expectations and confirmation bias also 
had a role.   
The new insight was about completion bias (Reason, 1990). Operations cannot usually be left 
incomplete. Unlike other work, the surgeon (performer) cannot start again another day. 
Moreover the working day finishes when operations (work) are complete, not a set time like 
a. shift, so there is intense pressure to finish, as that is the short-term measure of success.  
…once you say ‘That’s good enough’ then you can start to finish. You…can close the wound 
up. The end is in sight once you can say ‘Yes, that’s good enough (A15).  
Pressure increased when co-workers e.g. nurses, perceived a risk, or actual over-run of a list 
or case. As they must work to the end of shift, they have a vested interest in completion. 
Moreover they do not see outcomes of operations so for them, completion is the end-point and 
yardstick of success, unless plainly marred by error. 
(v) Error Detection 
Cues to detection. Checks and adjustments are self-monitoring processes that resolve minor 
problems throughout most operations and detect errors. Routine checks provided cues e.g. 
patient markings. By overlooking small factors this could cue major errors e.g. marking 
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absent leading to a wrong side operation. Detection often occurred when errors became 
visible during surgery e.g. bleeding. However, many errors remained undetected by surgeons 
until later, and completely undetected by other theatre staff. Biases of completion and 
optimism that the operation had ‘gone well’ interfered with error detection.  
Warnings by others. Warnings about rising pulse rate (anaesthetist), missed swab (scrub 
nurse) and wrong body side (registrar) were described, but had variable success in detecting 
errors. Contemporary theatre professionals were less experienced and knowledgeable about 
what was correct, so less aware of what was wrong. They had less seniority than formerly, 
and seemed less empowered to question surgeons. Finally, senior attitudes affected whether 
warnings were given. Many saw that the vertical hierarchy inhibited questioning. However 
some surgeons did not heed warnings, viewing advice as deficient or unhelpful.  
Not always necessarily a good thing if...er…a leader of the team is constantly doing 
what...um (tail off)...or has a lot of people saying ‘Do you think this is as it should be?’  You 
then become indecisive (A17). 
(vi) Emotions  
Few participants described emotions and. accounts were poorly elaborated and often played 
down. However emotions were acknowledged as important detrimental influences on 
decision-making. Some surgeons dissipated negative emotions by actively remaining calm or 
‘reengaging the logical side of the brain’. Extreme fear, anxiety and panic functioned as 
important cues to seeking help. Impulsiveness, demoralisation and surprise were reported.   
…Oh shit!  This is going completely pear-shaped. And you know, your bottom falls out...and 
that’s the time when you actually need somebody else to come in who’s not been involved; 
who’s completely ...able to...go back to the beginning and....help you out. (A17) 
Different feelings were reported at particular stages of the operation. Anticipation anxiety or a 
‘sense of foreboding’ before surgery; irritation with small accumulated events during surgery; 
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regret, annoyance or anger afterwards. Feelings about external events e.g. home stress, 
distracted surgeons from their task.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
(vii) Solutions, Strategies and Barriers.  
A striking lack of consensus was found: 96 strategies and solutions were offered covering 47 
types (Table 4). Consultants accumulated idiosyncratic repertoires of actions from experience 
which formed a resource or ‘safety net’. Diverse personal solutions probably arose from lack 
of training in addressing errors, and stress. Only one advocated standardising procedures. 
Different strategies were necessasry at particular stages of surgery (Table 4). Many were pre-
operative and precautionary providing useful training material. During surgery, well-used 
personal strategies involved known cognitive processes.  
Some creative strategies demonstrated good practice:  
I…write on the board the list of what I am going to do in the theatre before I start and…the 
series of steps that I’m  planning to take, and… possible alternatives, and then ask them to get 
out the equipment they are going to need for any of those alternatives. We review…all...X-
rays every morning, and all the cases (from) the day before...in a meeting (A20). 
Another described how in a crisis he made the patient safe, then removed his surgical gloves. 
As this required him to scrub again, valuable time was gained rethinking the operating plan 
away from the table.  
Barriers were inextricably and paradoxically intertwined with activating solutions. Although 
assistance could be requested, some consultants found this humiliating. Whether help was 
summoned depended on the technical problem, the surgeon’s personality and speciality. The 
main barriers were ‘defensive’ reporting system and the ‘blame culture’.  
The balance between the decisiveness of the leader of the team and him being able to take on 
board messages from the others...it’s not an easy dynamic (A17). 
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Discussion 
The study investigated consultant surgeon’s accounts about how and why ASEs occur within 
contemporary surgery. This qualitative investigation of processes contrasts with descriptive, 
quantitative previous research (e.g. Williams, et al, 2007). Pressure from government and 
management to work faster, harder, and beyond capacity, contextualises the increased 
potential for errors. Many surgeons reported the intensity of these pressures to operate on 
more patients, and ‘finish’ an operation or list, demonstrating completion bias. Greater 
awareness about biases should be built into surgical and management training with strategies 
to combat them. Structurally, targets and standards are achieved by selecting easier patients 
which also reduce ASE risks. However, this tactic may increase health inequalities; another 
focus of concern.  
Within a culture of individual blame for ASEs, environmental factors are downplayed. 
Management failure to organise smooth operating schedules and optimal theatre conditions 
arose from how the system works. Furthermore, management sometimes lacked empathy with 
the surgeon’s psychological state when pressing them to complete a list after a patient death. 
Such working environments damage performance, wasted time, resources and good will, and 
promote risky short cuts. Risks also increased if team competence was lacking due to eroded 
training and support and where teams were strangers. Pre-operative introductions are now 
required by the WHO Checklist. 
Seven ASE types indicated complex conceptualisation of this area. Definitions were tied to 
the seriousness of consequences, their persistence, and to decisions about reporting them. This 
classification provided a ‘rule of thumb’ for assessing consequences and a framework for 
understanding how and why events occurred. ‘Complication’ euphemistically embraces most 
ASEs but when specifically used, it referred to biological variations. Technical discrepancies 
and side-effects inherent to a particular operation were normal and therefore less significant. 
  
 
16 
Sub-optimal outcomes arising from competence/judgement flaws were more problematic but 
infrequent. Events avoidable through preparation contrasted with unavoidable events from 
unexpected/unknown factors. Uncontrollable factors caused widespread anxiety and were 
more serious. Despite extensive expertise, consultants were never invulnerable during routine 
procedures. These slips, mistakes and lapses occurred at skills- and rules-based performance 
levels, partly explaining Regenbogen et al’s (2007) findings. Where faults were correctable, 
potentially serious near-misses could have positive outcomes. Technically, these serious 
errors were detected just before a disaster. Real errors and mistakes often had extremely 
serious consequences. However paradoxically, small errors might have ‘catastrophic’ 
consequences and major errors trivial outcomes. How an ASE was interpreted was influenced 
by anticipated consequences for professionals; a mechanism representing the ‘blame culture’. 
Error risk mounted when a ‘cascade’ of possibly trivial events occurred. As this sequence 
progressed, consultants knew they were ‘skating on thin ice’. This process was exacerbated 
by negative emotions e.g. irritation. Optimally intercepting this process deserves further 
investigation. Single error events e.g. severing a nerve, could also be serious if, as commonly 
happened, no warning signs occurred. As these events are harder to anticipate, improvements 
to practice are problematic. While automatic thinking aided rapid routines and reduced strain 
by providing subconscious checks/adjustments to prevent later problems, it generated 
important errors from overconfidence and complacency as optimism bias.  
Some problems in dealing with errors were social. Although team responsibilities included 
warning others, ‘speaking out’ was inhibited when viewed as inappropriate or interfering, 
especially for inexperienced staff. Summoning assistance depended on the surgeon’s 
speciality, seniority, personality, acceptability standards and hierarchy. Although team 
members sometimes identified their own errors e.g. missed checks, close attention to their 
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task meant they infrequently noticed others errors. Error rates increased under pressure to 
‘finish’ an operation, and during this period tasks overlapped and role boundaries blurred.  
Although emotions play a role in ASEs, surgeons could recall little about how these 
functioned, possible due to attrition over time. Cultural pressure against articulating emotions 
is integral to training and enables surgeons to continue functioning. After ASEs, new 
strategies were added to a surgeon’s repertoire, providing a resource and ‘safety net’. 
Replacing retrospective procedures with real-time or short-term methodology in the future 
could improve access to fleeting emotions, and data quality. 
Important environmental, organisational and systemic factors contributed to ASEs but lack 
incorporation within existing models. Consultants felt disempowered to influence these 
factors; uncharacteristic features of a profession who typically assume high control levels. 
Prolonged uncontrollability causes helplessness depression (Abramson, Seligman et al, 1981). 
To increase controllability and improve mental health, Trusts should provide surgeons with 
communication channels to a speciality safety team who can rapidly rectify problems.  
Although the Checklist is now used routinely to prevent errors throughout NHS hospitals only 
some factors important to expert surgeons are included; environmental, organisational and 
social issues are substantially overlooked. Checklist use could offer secondary benefits to 
management-surgeon relations through working together towards mutually important goals of 
reducing ASEs.  
As strategies for dealing with ASEs were diverse, pragmatic and highly idiosyncratic, 
introducing standard guidelines could prove unacceptable. Surveys of professional bodies 
could further investigate consensus about ‘best’ practice. Environmental explanations for 
ASE volunteered by Trusts could dispel the personal blame culture. Good leadership within 
this new organisational atmosphere would promote situational solutions. Furthermore, 
professional development surrounding help-seeking would reframe these actions positively. 
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More self-confident leadership could transform vertical hierarchies into horizontal ones, 
promoting appropriate warnings and enhancing team spirit. While organisational change can 
be slow, reducing the human and financial costs of ASEs is pressing.  
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Table 1: Summary of Themes offered by Consultant Surgeons about Adverse Surgical 
Events 
(i) Healthcare system              Political context 
      Professional responsibility 
(ii) Contributing factors   Organisation and culture of health care 
      Ergonomic factors 
      Environmental factors 
      Task factors 
      Team factors 
      Surgeon factors 
      Patient factors 
(iii) Types of adverse surgical events  Technical discrepancies 
      Complications 
      Side-effects 
      Sub-optimal outcomes 
      (Un)avoidable events 
      Near misses 
      Errors and mistakes 
(iv) Cognitive processes   Automatic thoughts 
      Decision-making 
(v) Error detection    Cues to detection 
      Warnings by others     
(vi) Emotions     Before, during & after 
(vii) Implementation    Strategies and solutions for different stages 
      Barriers: personality, conflict, hierarchy 
 
Table 2: Factors Contributing to Adverse Surgical Events 
Categories Factors 
Organisational & culture 
of health care 
Overburdened lists 
Inadequate training 
Poorly staffed teams 
Poor match: team to procedure. 
Inadequate beds, hospital chaos 
Stressful environment 
Pressure to meet Government targets 
Pressure to compromise personal standards 
Fatigue/exhaustion: workload or work stress 
Not following safety procedures 
Costs & limits to resources  
Ergonomic factors Patient’s position slipped 
Incorrect incision position 
Drapes incorrectly positioned 
Environmental factors Interruption during operation 
Inappropriate music/noise 
Inappropriate lighting 
Theatre temperature 
Incorrect instruments/kit 
Unfamiliar environment 
Task factors Unprepared change to procedures 
Changing the order of the theatre list 
Complexity of procedure: inherent risks 
Poor execution of procedure 
Taking over from fellow surgeon 
Team factors   Poor communication 
Lack of knowledge of others: no cohesion 
Irrelevant chatter: distraction 
Incompetence of individual team members 
Team members not concentrating 
Fatigue or exhaustion due to personal life 
Lack of knowledge of procedure 
Unfamiliarity with equipment 
Lack of supervisory support 
Surgeon factors Lack of pre-operative planning 
Lack of technical skills/experience of procedure 
Personality of surgeon & effect on team dynamics 
Personality of surgeon: acceptable standards 
Overconfident 
Insufficient pre-op. investigation/tests 
Out of practice e.g. returning from leave 
Rushing/omitting steps or safety procedures/checks 
Not seeing patient pre-op; not marking patient 
Stressed 
Lack of concentration 
Patient factors Obesity 
Previous surgical history present 
Children as patients 
Not well; tissues poor quality/inflamed 
Combination of pathology 
Patient selection (unlikely to do well) 
Access to organs problematic; unusual anatomy 
Table 3: Specific Adverse Events reported by Consultant Surgeons 
Typology of error Description of event Description of error or 
near-miss 
Outcome for patient 
1.  
Evaluation mistake 
Surgical outcome sub-
optimal 
Ignored evidence: sub-
optimal outcome  
Subsequent operation 
to correct error 
2.  
Perception slip 
Evaluation slip 
Patient had stabbed self Emergency: no pre-op 
investigation. Extent of 
damage misunderstood. 
Beyond surgeons experience 
Unknown.  
Surgeon with relevant 
speciality called to deal 
with operation 
3.  
Evaluation mistake 
Action Execution slip 
Patient very ill: high 
temperature  
No pre-op investigation. 
Unexpected pathology & 
pneumonia. Inflammation: 
stitch failed. Bleeding 
Near miss.  
Bleeding discovered. 
Subsequent operation 
to repair failed stitch 
4.  
Action Execution 
mistake 
Difficult operation with 
participant assisting. 
Consultant ‘gung-ho’ 
Consultant wrongly cut 
(body part). Tried to fix cut 
but did not know how 
Serious adverse 
outcome: patient died 
5.  
Action Execution slip 
Consultant took over routine 
operation from colleague. 
Wrong position uncorrected 
Consultant drilled too deep Permanent adverse 
outcome. Patient lost 
function area of body 
6.  
Action Execution slip 
Action Evaluation slip 
Overseeing operation by 
registrar 
Registrar pulled clamp and 
tore skin. Consultant 
repaired tear, but left 
undetected hole 
Temporary adverse 
outcome. Patient 
suffered leakage. 
Required further 
operation & 3 months 
hospital stay 
7.  
Evaluation 
Interpretation mistake 
Consultant began operation 
on wrong side: nurse 
incorrectly prepared & 
draped patient. Registrar, 
who had spoken to patient, 
left room to operate 
elsewhere: staff shortage 
Consultant assumed checks 
had been made. Began 
operating on wrong side 
Near miss. Registrar 
returned & voiced 
error. Consultant 
repaired wrong side & 
continued on correct 
side 
8.  
Action Execution 
mistake 
Action Evaluation slip 
Changed operation 
procedure during surgery. 
Correct sized swabs not 
available. Small swabs used 
to pack open wound 
Unanticipated change in 
procedure so correct swabs 
not available. Nurse did 
swab count: one short. Swab 
left inside patient 
Near miss  
Swab count picked up 
error. Surgeon 
reopened & removed 
missing swab 
9.  
Action Execution slip 
Retractor lever slipped and 
the (body part) of patient 
subsequently moved during 
operation 
Mechanical failure of 
retractor. Surgeon had not 
completed necessary check 
before procedure 
Near miss 
Surgeon corrected 
patient position & 
corrected retractor 
10.  
Evaluation 
Interpretation slip &  
Action Execution 
mistake 
Temporary implant rod cut 
through patient (body part) 
Surgeon initially missed 
information that became 
known just before operation. 
Required changed 
procedure: suboptimal 
Patient required 
another operation 
11.  
Action execution slip 
Evaluation & 
Interpretation mistake 
Emergency. Surgeon called 
to operation; rest of team 
dealt with patient 
Emergency. Anaesthetist 
intubated oesophagus not 
trachea. Assumed 
machinery readings were 
wrong & that problem was 
linked to patient injuries 
Patient died 
 
Table 4: Strategies to avoid Adverse Surgical Events  
Type of Strategy Strategy 
 During operation 
Personal Shift thought processes to problem-solving 
Call for help from colleagues 
Focus: ignore irrelevant events and stresses 
Recognise that situation is beyond experience 
Be receptive to problems occurring  
Keep calm  
Make checks and if necessary, retrace steps 
Do not act impulsively; check evidence 
Take a short break 
Team-related Interact with team to identify or solve problem 
Team know each other, including abilities. 
Communication between team members 
Senior specialists e.g. anaesthetists, offer supervision to 
juniors 
Assistant concentrate & work hard to support surgeon 
Anaesthetist offer encouragement 
Supervision given to junior surgeons 
Operate with fellow consultant 
Task-related Display, identify, simplify & isolate problem 
Make site safe, then stop 
Make physical adjustments to correct small problems  
Accurate transfer of information when swapping staff 
Use safety checklist during operation 
Use X-rays 
 Prior to operation 
Organisation Match operation with surgeon’s ability 
Provide suitable operating environment 
Match team’s expertise to procedure 
Personal Do not undertake (a) unnecessarily dangerous operations 
or (b) those beyond own experience  
or (c) if feeling stressed. 
Pre-plan action; also alternatives in event of problem 
Make checks: patient marking, patient diagnosis  
Practice & prepare for procedure 
Change lists around or cancel if full team not available 
Agree department safety standards: follow them 
Theatre lists must  take account of leave 
Talk to patient 
Plan for appropriate after-care 
Set & maintain predetermined outcomes/standards 
Task-related 
 
 
Juniors learn from near misses: controlled conditions 
Learn operations as step-wise procedures 
Ensure familiarity with machinery/equipment 
 After Operation 
Organisation / 
System 
 
More open and less defensive reporting system 
More investment/resources put into reporting systems 
Incorporate errors into training 
Personal  Self-audit work: undertake training if necessary. 
Talk to patient & make post–op. checks 
Team-related Review operations next day in team meeting, discuss 
outcome & make changes. 
